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PROPERTY’S ENDS: THE PUBLICNESS OF PRIVATE LAW VALUES 
Gregory S. Alexander∗ 
 
Property theorists commonly suppose that property has as its ends certain private values, such as 
individual autonomy and personal security. This Article contends that property’s real end is human 
flourishing, that is, living a life that is as fulfilling as possible. Human flourishing, although property’s 
ultimate end, is neither monistic or simple. Rather, it is inclusive and comprises multiple values. Those 
values, the content of human flourishing, derives, at least in part, from an understanding of the sorts of 
beings we are ― social and political.  A consequence of this conception of the human condition is that the 
values of which human flourishing is constitutive ― property’s ends― are public as well as private. 
Further, the public and private values that serve as property’s ends are mutually dependent for their 
realization. Hence, any account of property that assigns it solely to the private sphere, categorically 
removed from public values, is incoherent. 
 
  
Donald Lamp was outraged. Every morning since 9/11, the 89-year-old World War II 
veteran had hung an American flag from the balcony of his Omaha, Nebraska, apartment. But in 
May 2004, the management board of the retirement community in which he lives ordered him to 
remove his flag, citing a violation of one of the covenants in the master plan that governs the 
development. Lamp refused. 
 
 These sorts of disputes are not uncommon in homeowner associations. What made 
Donald Lamp’s case noteworthy was the fact that he was the father-in-law of U.S. Supreme 
Court Justice Clarence Thomas, a fact apparently of little moment to the association’s general 
manager. “We have a lot of important people here,” she said. However true that may be, Lamp’s 
case got national attention, much of it unfavorable for the homeowner association. A typical 
reaction was this posting on a blog site: “Donald Lamp fought for our right and his right to 
display our nation’s flag anywhere and anytime.”1 
 
 The question, of course, is, does Mr. Lamp have such a right? On one view, a view 
informed by the private law values of property law, the answer, quite clearly, is no. The covenant 
restricting the display of flags within the development was included in Mr. Lamp’s deed. He had 
legal notice, either actual or record notice, of it at the time he entered into the purchase of his 
unit, and agreed to be bound to it. The matter is strictly one of consent. So long as he had notice 
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of the restrictive covenant at the time he entered into the agreement with the association, he is 
bound by it.2  
 
 Donald Lamp and his supporters did not see the matter this way. To them, some values 
cannot be contracted away. These are fundamental values ― public values ― and among them is 
the right to display the American flag. So the argument goes. 
 
 The dispute between Mr. Lamp and his homeowner association is not aberrational. There 
have been many such disputes, some litigated, some not, over conduct ranging from speech to 
religion to satellite antennas. Although not all of these disputes involve values that could 
plausibly be characterized as fundamental (the right to hang a clothesline outdoors?), many of 
them do. The question is whether such values have any traction in the realm of private ordering. 
 
 I want to approach this question in a somewhat unusual way. In the U.S., the usual 
approach to the question is through public law, notably the American constitutional doctrine of 
state action. Under this doctrine, constitutional values do not apply unless there has been state 
action, i.e., unless the actor responsible for the restriction or other action in question is a 
government agency or otherwise acting under the authority of the government. Constitutional 
norms and their attending values do not apply to strictly private actions.  
 
That approach has been singularly unhelpful. It asks under what circumstances it is 
appropriate for public law norms and their underlying values to intrude upon the domain of 
private volition, replacing that sphere’s own distinctive set of values with its own. There are two 
related and contestable assumptions here. The first, and more familiar, assumption is that there is 
a categorical separation between the public and private spheres. The second assumption is 
perhaps less obvious ― that a similar sort of distinction exists between the values which inhere 
in the norms regulating the two spheres, indeed that the differences between the two sets of 
values are such that there is, or least may be, a basic level of incompatibility between them. It is 
this second assumption that I wish to challenge. I argue that not only are the values that inhere in 
public law norms compatible with the values that serve as the normative foundation of private 
property but further that such public values may be necessary for realization of private property’s 
ends.  
 
This Article operates at both a conceptual and a normative level. At a conceptual level it 
seeks to elucidate the normative basis of the private law of property. In particular, it explicates 
how at as a conceptual matter the private values of property relate to and interact with property’s 
public values, so that the two dimensions of property’s value constitution cohere rather than 
conflict. At a normative level, I argue that even if one rejects the interpretation of property as 
resting on a moral foundation of human flourishing, understood as constituted by multiple 
values, both public and private, the human flourishing theory represents the best approach to 
develop a morally pluralistic theory of property that relates multiple public and private values, 
which are commonly seen as in conflict, as coherent and mutually supportive.    
 
The normative foundation of private property, I argue, is human flourishing. I understand 
human flourishing to mean that a person has the opportunity to live a life as fulfilling as possible 
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for him or her. This account of human flourishing is morally pluralistic; that is, it rejects the 
notion that there exists a single irreducible fundamental moral value to which all other moral 
values may be reduced. Rather, it conceives of human flourishing as including (but not limited 
to) ― individual autonomy, personal security/privacy, self-determination, self-expression, and 
responsibility (along with other virtues). The thesis of this Article is that these values, the values 
that theorists take to be among the intended ends of private property, far from being in conflict or 
incompatible with fundamental public values, at times require recognition of public values for 
property’s own values to be realized. Stated differently, human flourishing, understood as 
morally pluralistic, includes both private and public values. From this perspective, then, the 
relationship between private property and public values should be seen as symbiotic rather than 
antagonistic.  
 
This insight has cash value. Most immediately, it enables a wide array of disputes like 
Donald Lamp’s, disputes that appear to require the intervention of the state though its medium of 
public law, in either statutory or constitutional form, to be resolved solely on private law grounds 
without resorting to state involvement, other than as the facilitator for dispute resolution through 
its courts. Specifically, there is no need for the state to become directly involved in these private 
two-party disputes in order to operationalize the values that public law expresses. For example, 
as I shall later discuss,3 many of the public accommodation cases which were decided on 
constitutional or statutory grounds could have been resolved in favor of a right to public 
accommodation solely on private law grounds. Private law is sufficiently capacious to include 
public law’s values and to operationalize them itself.   
 
Another, broader implication of the Article’s thesis is that it helps explain why property 
owners owe obligations to others, expressed by what I have elsewhere called the social 
obligation norm of property.4 Further, it helps explain why this social obligation norm is internal 
to the concept of ownership itself rather than the obligations being externally imposed on owners 
by the state. What may at first blush appear extrinsic is in fact intrinsic to private law norms. 
Finally, it helps explain the limits of those obligations. Property rights, the obligations that inhere 
in property ownership, and the limits of those obligations all derive from the same source ― 
human flourishing. Both the rights and the obligations of property are necessary as means of 
realizing human flourishing. 
 
To illustrate how public values advance the values underlying private property, the values 
that comprise human flourishing, I shall discuss two problems that have been the subjects of 
considerable discussion in American property legal literature in recent years, the right to exclude 
and the enforceability of restrictive covenants in homeowner associations. 
 
I begin in Part I with an account of human flourishing, which is the moral foundation of 
private property. The discussion of human flourishing paves the way for understanding 
property’s ends ― the private law values that undergird it. These values are what Part II 
undertakes to explain. Part III then shifts attention to the public values that are, at least at times, 
necessary for realization of human flourishing. Those values include, among others, equality, 
inclusiveness, community, participation, and self-constitution. Part IV is the core of the theory. It 
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explains how the public values help realize the private values of which human flourishing is 
partly constituted such that human flourishing comes to be seen as a project in which public and 
private cannot be categorically distinguished from each other but blend into each other and 
mutually support each other. Part V illustrates the theory by discussing two sets of property 
disputes in which asserted private property rights have been challenged on the basis of appeals to 
public values―controversies over servitudes that restrict certain personal freedoms in 
homeowner associations and limits on private land owners’ right to exclude. 
 
 
I. HUMAN FLOURISHING: A PLURALIST CONCEPTION 
 
 The conception of human flourishing that I shall use here must be distinguished from 
welfare, as that term is used in modern legal and economic analysis. Welfare is a quite confusing 
and imprecise term. We often use it in such way as to suggest that it refers to one single thing, 
i.e., one single value, but a moment’s reflection should indicate that it does not. Welfare is a term 
that we commonly use to refer to several different values, such as pleasure, health, safety, 
satisfaction, and so on. This is not the sense in which economists and law-and-economics 
scholars, who focus on welfare-maximization, apparently use the term, however.  
 
To see this, consider a set of distinctions made famous by Derek Parfit a number of years 
ago. Parfit usefully distinguished among three types of theories of how a person’s life can go 
maximally well: (1) hedonistic theories, which suppose that what makes a person’s life goes best 
for him is what makes him happiest; (2) desire-fulfillment theories, which provide that the good 
for a person is what fulfills his desires; and (3) objective-list theories, according to which 
“certain things are good or bad for us, whether or not we want to have the good things, or to 
avoid the bad things.”5 Welfarism, in the law-and-economics sense, trades on a version of the 
second of Parfit’s three theories, a version that we can call the preference-satisfaction theory.6 It 
supposes that there is one and only one value―maximization of preference satisfaction. All other 
values can be reduced to that single, irreducible value. In this respect, welfarism, as a moral 
theory, is a value monist theory.7  
 
Modern legal welfarists sometimes suppose that welfare and human flourishing      
concepts are synonymous, but they are not, at least not in the senses in which they use the term 
welfare and I shall use the concept of human flourishing. The term human flourishing is, of 
course, a translation of Aristotle’s term eudaimonia, which is often, but misleadingly, translated 
as happiness. Human flourishing is a better translation for multiple reasons, not the least of 
which is that it is conducive to a pluralist understanding, whereas happiness is less so. 
 
In contrast to welfare, as welfarists use that term, human flourishing, as I shall use the 
term, is a value pluralist concept. The conception of flourishing upon which I shall rely denies 
that human flourishing is a genuinely unitary value. Indeed, the theory here denies that there are 
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any genuinely unitary values at all. There are many ways for a person’s life to flourish,8 and 
there are many values that are constitutive of human flourishing, or the well-lived life.  
 
In addition to being value-pluralist, the conception of human flourishing adopted here is 
also an objective theory. It rejects the view that what is good or valuable for a person is 
determined entirely by that person’s own evaluation of the matter. Human flourishing is not 
purely a matter of agent sovereignty.9 That is, the theory holds that claims about what is 
prudentially valuable for a person can be objectively right or wrong, rather than solely a matter 
of someone’s evaluative perspective.10 In this respect, the theory is an objective theory of the 
good.  
 
Any list of values that are constitutive of human flourishing will necessarily be 
contestable.11 I shall identify several values which I believe will be relatively less controversial 
than others (some may be more contestable than others). At any rate, for present purpose let us 
stipulate this as an acceptable, although very incomplete list of values that are constitutive of 
human flourishing. Among the values that I shall discuss are autonomy, self-realization, 
personhood, community, and equality.  
  
As these values indicate, the conception of human flourishing upon which I shall draw 
here is, broadly speaking, Aristotelian. It is based on Aristotle’s understanding of human 
character as inherently social.12 Life within a society and webs of social relationships is a 
necessary condition for humans to flourish, i.e., for their lives to go maximally well. The 
conception adopted here rejects interpretations of human character ―the sorts of beings we are 
― as what is often described as atomistic. The interpretation of human character upon which my 
conception of human flourishing is based sees humans as dependent upon each other literally 
from birth through death.13 They depend upon each other on a wide range of matters, from health 
to education to practical reasoning to socialization.  The core values that I have identified as 
constitutive of human flourishing reflect humans’ sociability and inherent and unavoidable 
dependency upon each other. 
 
II. PROPERTY’S ENDS 
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Private property is instrumental; it serves particular ends. Precisely what those ends are 
is, of course, a highly contestable matter. I argue here that the best instrumental account of 
property is one that expresses property’s ends its terms of human flourishing, itself a pluralistic 
concept that includes multiple values. In this Part, I identify five private law values that are at the 
core of human flourishing and that are commonly considered to be among property’s main ends 
― autonomy, personal security/privacy, self-determination, self-expression, and personal 
responsibility. Although this is by no means an exhaustive list, it captures those values that I take 
to be central to the instrumental fit between property and human flourishing.  
 
A. Autonomy 
 
 Autonomy will perhaps be the least controversial of the five values that I identify as 
private values that are property’s ends. Many, if not most, property theorists identify individual 
autonomy as an important value that property serves. Among property theorists, some, notably 
libertarians and Kantians, place autonomy at the core of property’s raison d’être. But even those 
who do not view autonomy as the foundational end of property still view it as an important 
aspect of the justification for private property rights.14 This is true even of utilitarianism and its 
latter-day cognate, welfarism.  
 
 It is sometimes said that utilitarianism is a collectivist theory (and so its justification of 
property).15 On this view, autonomy would appear to play little role as a justification for 
property. The justification of property would be strictly confined to collectivist matters, namely, 
net social utility. But Jeremy Waldron convincingly argues that this is a mistaken view of 
utilitarianism.16 What the utilitarian wants to maximize, Waldron reminds us,17 is the 
individual’s personal satisfaction (or, in welfarist terms, preferences). It is precisely because the 
utilitarian takes the individual’s own definition of his/her satisfaction as given that the utilitarian 
is committed to personal autonomy.18  
 
 Autonomy was the main justification for property in civic republican theory as well. 
From the republican perspective the function of private ownership of property (land, in 
particular) was to remove the citizen’s dependence on others so that he could practice virtuous 
citizenship.19 Property ownership bestowed on a person self-reliance, which facilitated the 
practice of virtue in the civic realm by assuring that one’s judgment was unencumbered by 
economic obligations to others. Here, then, autonomy, through property, was for the purpose of 
joining the public sphere rather than being secured from it. 
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 Variations of the republican version of the autonomy argument for property have 
appeared in recent years. Charles Reich’s famous “New Property” theory,20 for example, 
developed a somewhat different strand of the argument. More recently, Frank Michelman 
developed a version of the autonomy argument that had a distinctly redistributive twist.21 All 
citizens should have a voice in the political order, he argued, and, following republican 
principles, political voice requires autonomy that can be provided only by property. In modern 
society, however, such political autonomy through property can be secured only through 
government redistribution of property.22  
 
B. Personal Security/Privacy 
 
 Property, it has long been thought, provides a person a safe haven.23 As Jeremy Waldron 
observes, “Humans need a refuge from the general society of mankind.”24 Property, especially 
landed property, supposedly provides that refuge to its owners.   
 
 An important aspect of the security that is thought to result from private ownership of 
property is privacy. The connection between privacy and property is familiar, of course. The 
home, for example, is perhaps the most familiar nexus between property and privacy. Indeed, the 
home is the locus classicus linking property, security, and privacy with autonomy (or freedom).25 
Waldron argues that individuals need not just “a house, a flat, or a room of one’s own”26 for “a 
place where they can be assured of being alone, if that is what they want, or assured of the 
conditions of intimacy with others, where intimacy is called for.”27 What they specifically need 
is a “household”28; moreover, it must be a “household of their own.”29 
 
 Personal security includes not only physical protection but protection from other forms of 
insecurity as well, such as financial insecurity and political insecurity. Charles Reich was 
worried about just these forms of insecurity when he attacked the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme 
Court in the notable case of Flemming v. Nestor30 as “resembl[ing] the philosophy of feudal 
tenure.”31 “Just as the feudal system lord and vassal through a system of mutual dependence, 
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obligation, and loyalty,” Reich wrote, “so government largess binds man to the state.”32 The 
difference between feudalism and government largess, according to Reich’s account, is that there 
is no mutuality in the relationship between the individual and the state with respect to 
government largess. As the decision in Flemming makes abundantly clear, the recipient of 
government largess is utterly dependent on the state. Nestor’s insecurity, resulting from the 
Court’s refusal to treat his benefits as constitutional property, could hardly have been made 
clearer than by the facts that not only was his only regular source of income cut off, but the 
federal government saw fit to deport him to his native country because of his past affiliation with 
the Communist Party. 
 
 The connection between property and individual security can be made in a more 
metaphysical sense as well. 19th century Hegelian theorists considered the basic rationale of 
property to be “that everyone should be secured by society in the power of getting and keeping 
the means of realising [sic] a will . . . .”33 The meaning of security here is less tangible perhaps 
than earlier senses of security, but it shares the same ideas that property performs a kind of 
protective function and that this protection enables individuals in certain ways and to do certain 
things.  
 
C. Self-Determination 
 
 The link between property and self-determination is established most clearly perhaps in 
Hegel, but it is evident in other theories as well, such as the civic republican tradition. In 
Hegelian theory, self-determination is closely related to freedom.34 Self-determination is an 
aspect is freedom; indeed, for Hegel, freedom is self-determination. Hegel’s own conception of 
self-determination is rather metaphysical, but Alan Brudner offers a more accessible version of it 
in these terms: Self-determination is, Brudner argues “a power to act from determinate ends that 
are themselves coherent expressions of freedom because they are neither adopted unreflectively 
nor imposed by an external will.”35 Here is another take on the Hegelian notion of self-
determination: “When we . . . view[] our desires as material to be regulated and ordered in line 
with desires of a high order still (for example the desire not to be the kind of person we see 
ourselves being or becoming) we reach a clearer understanding of the slippery concept of self-
determination.”36  
 
 The connection between this understanding of self-determination and property comes 
through in the notion of ordering our desires. Because we live in communities with others, we 
will use our property in pursuing our considered goals, but we do so in full recognition of others’ 
legitimate claims to respect.37 Ordering our desires also means that in pursuing our goals through 
property, we will develop and rely on a system of norms regulating the scope of property 
rights.38  
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 The point to emphasize about this approach to self-determination is how social it is. Self-
determination cannot occur atomistically or in isolation from society. Self-determination is a 
process that is deeply dependent upon community for its higher and higher realization. 
 
D. Self-Expression 
 
 Self-expression is perhaps not a value that is obviously associated with private ownership 
of property, but it is nevertheless one of property’s important ends. By “self-expression,” I mean 
to include a capacious range of forms and senses in which people assert themselves. At property 
law’s most basic level, for example, possession constitutes, as Carol Rose reminds us, a mode of 
communication.39 “Possession as the basis of property ownership,” Rose suggests, “seems to 
amount to something like yelling loudly enough for all who may be interested.”40 It is a matter of 
communicating a claim in a particular sort of way, a mode of expression that carries a great deal 
of meaning regarding the claimant’s psychological attachment to the object in question. 
 
 Possession is hardly the only nexus between property and self-expression. Jeremy 
Waldron argues that there are three larger connections between self-expression and property.41 
First, we can understand the connection between property and self-expression in terms of a 
person’s assertion against nature. It is not only Hegel who viewed nature as, to borrow Alan 
Ryan’s phrase, “blankly material,” “hav[ing] no point or purpose of [its] own.”42 This was 
Locke’s attitude toward nature as well, and many moderns share it. From this point of view, 
people give purpose to nature by asserting themselves over it. Self-expression in this context 
involves involvement in projects through which individuals plan and exercise control over some 
aspect of the general endeavor.43  
 
 A second mode of connection between self-expression and property is a person’s 
assertion of herself against others.44 This mode of the connection is most evident perhaps in the 
market, where “forces of competition” is another term for networks of conflicting yet 
coordinated acts of self-assertion. By asserting oneself against others in market transactions, a 
person may or may not be seeking domination over the other. Self-assertion may, but need not 
result in domination where both parties are engaged in acts of self-assertion for mutual gain. 
Whether domination results depends upon the circumstances of their interaction, in particular, 
the power relationship between them. 
 
 The third mode of connection between self-expression and property that Waldron 
identifies is slightly more nuanced than the first two. Waldron states the connection this way: 
“Since ownership rights impose constraints on the behaviour of others, my having these rights 
involves others’ recognizing me as a source of moral constraint and thus as a locus of respect.”45 
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The idea here is that the fact that others are willing to restrict their pursuit of their own desire in 
the interest of my freedom gives me a greater appreciation of my freedom. In particular, it 
permits me to see and gives me confidence in the social dimension of my freedom. As Waldron 
points out, however, systems of private property are not unique in this respect. Successful 
common property regimes must do so as well in order to enable cooperative behavior.46 Still, the 
social coordinating benefits of private property are well-known. 
 
E. Responsibility 
 
 Private property can be seen as serving and promoting different virtues.47 Here, I want to 
focus on one virtue in particular ― responsibility. The connection between property ownership 
and personal responsibility can be developed on the basis of diverse strands of thought. One is 
the tradition of positive liberty.48 From this perspective a person is not truly free until his desires, 
plans, and goals are stabilized so that there is continuity between the plans and actions of his past 
and those of his future.49 The person who acts on the basis of whim, who flits from one impulse 
to another, is not truly free but instead is a hostage to such unstable urges. Such a person has no 
real sense of enduring identity. Even his moral agency is subject to doubt. 
 
 Private ownership of property, the argument goes, fosters a deeper sense of freedom by 
stabilizing a person in particular ways. The idea is that a regime of private ownership inculcates 
in individuals a sense of personal responsibility because they realize that they must effectively 
manage their own property if they are to satisfy their own needs. Through ownership individuals 
acquire not only certain skills but, more important, particular habits of thought ― forward-
looking, calculating, and mindful of alternatives ― that free them from caprice and whim and 
give them an understanding of what T.H. Green called the “permanent good.”50 
 
 Another strand of thought connecting property with responsibility focuses less on 
responsibility to oneself than responsibility to others. There is a very old tradition of property 
theory that is concerned with the responsibilities that individual owners owe to their societies. 
Connected with ideas of ownership (especially of land) as stewardship, the tradition dates back at 
least to Biblical texts.51 In modern versions of this tradition some theorists have argued that a 
social obligation is inherent in the concept of ownership itself.52 Other recent theorists have 
similarly argued that “[o]wnership entails not only the granting of rights but also the adoption of 
obligations.”53 Moreover, these theorists have argued, “[s]ome obligations on owners of property 
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toward nonowners are morally justified even when this entails some measure of sacrifice of self-
interest.”54  
 
 The idea that owners owe responsibilities to their societies is a major theme in property 
theory in many legal systems. In Latin America, for example, there is an important tradition in 
property legal theory emphasizing the “social function of property.”55 This tradition, whose 
origins are usually traced to the French legal theorist Leòn Duguit,56 views property not in terms 
of a right but rather as a social function.57 Not only does the owner owe responsibilities to put the 
property to the service of the community, but the state should protect property only to the extent 
that the owner fulfills this social responsibility.58 This version of the social-responsibility theory 
goes considerably beyond that articulated by recent American property theorists, whose theory 
remains within the scope of liberalism. 
 
 
III. THE PUBLIC VALUES OF HUMAN FLOURISHING 
 
This Part discusses some of the values that constitute the public dimension of human 
flourishing. Living a life that goes maximally well for each of us is not a strictly private or 
solitary endeavor. Part of the reason lies in our character as social beings. Another part lies in our 
inherent dependency on others for nurturing those capabilities that are essential to human 
flourishing. This dependency embeds each of us in various overlapping and sometimes shifting 
communities, including obvious ones such as families, co-workers, and friends, but also less 
obvious, more attenuated communities such as neighborhoods, municipal communities, political 
communities, spiritual communities, and the like. Our embeddedness within and dependency 
upon these multiple and various communities mean that human flourishing implicates another set 
of values, values that are usually considered public rather than private in character. This Part 
identifies five such public values. Part IV will then explain why these nominally public values 
are in fact internal to the private law of property and thus are constitutive of property’s ends.    
 
A. Equality 
 
Equality is, of course, a notoriously ambiguous term. I am using it here not in the sense of 
equality of resources or any material respect but in the Kantian sense of equal dignity. By virtue 
of our humanity alone, we are all entitled to being treated as moral agents of equal dignity and 
worthy of equal respect. A life characterized by degrading treatment and disrespect by others is 
not a life that can be said to go maximally well. A flourishing life means, if anything, one that is 
marked by those forms of treatment given to people whom others regard as ends rather than 
means.  
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There is a close relationship between the conception of equality that I am using here and 
community. Specifically, the idea of equality used here views the whole point of equality as 
living within a community in which everyone is treated with respect, and equally so. Even more 
specifically, the community of equals is one that seeks to realize the political and moral ideal of 
non-subordination. It is a community that has no truck with social hierarchies, or social stigmas 
that mark some individuals as inherently inferior to others. There are no social relations based on 
perceptions of inherent superiority and inferiority among people.  
 
 By contrast, the inegalitarian society, the society based on principles of subordination, is 
one in which the proper society order is regarded as a hierarchy of human beings, based on their 
intrinsic worth.  From such a perspective, inequality refers, as Elizabeth Anderson puts it, “not so 
much to distributions to goods as to relations between superior and inferior persons.”59 In 
modern societies social ranking has many bases, including vestiges of slavery and imperialism, 
race, gender, caste, class, disability, ethnicity, and others. Equality-as-non-subordination means 
simply that all such bases of social ranking, in the sense of evaluating some human beings as 
inherently inferior to others, are illegitimate. The egalitarian community, then, is one in which all 
persons are treated as equals in this sense.  
 
B. Inclusiveness 
 
Closely related to equality but distinct from it is inclusiveness. It means the opportunity 
to join with others in groups or communities for various reasons. If sociality characterizes the 
sorts of beings we are, then inclusiveness ― the opportunity to join and to belong ― must be 
available to individuals in order for their lives to go maximally well.  
 
The antithesis of this value is exclusion. There are, of course, many varieties of 
exclusion. I will mention only three here ― social, political, and physical. Others are relevant to 
inclusiveness, but these three varieties of exclusion best illustrate my point. 
 
Social exclusion occurs when individuals or groups are denied rights or opportunities that 
are normally available to all other members of society. Here we see the close relationship 
between inclusiveness and equality, for the grounds of social exclusion commonly coincide with 
bases of subordination, including race, ethnicity, religion, caste, and gender.  
 
Social exclusionary practices may be formal or informal. Some are legally-sanctioned, 
while others persist despite formal legal condemnation. Some are direct; others are more subtle. 
Lior Strahilevitz provides illuminating examples of these more subtle exclusionary practices in 
his study of what he calls “exclusionary amenities.”60 Consider, Strahilevitz says, the effect of 
golf courses as an amenity offered in common interest communities during the 1990s. At the 
time, very few African-Americans played golf,61 so the golf is a proxy for race. This has enabled 
developers of common interest communities to offer housing that effectively satisfies a 
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preference for residential racial homogeneity. Similarly, real estate brokers reported continue to 
use a practice known as “red-lining” to steer African-Americans away from certain urban 
neighborhoods to keep them exclusive or predominately in racial composition, even though 
federal statutory law has long since declared that practice illegal.62  
 
By political exclusion, I mean the inability to participate fully in life of the political 
community as a result of barriers established, formally or informally, by the polity’s leadership 
or by its political culture. Many societies have practiced political exclusion through a variety of 
tactics, some straightforward, others quite subtle. Some forms of political exclusion have been 
tied to property ownership itself, and even where property ownership is not a condition of 
political inclusion, for example, it is not a condition of citizenship, non-ownership may still 
frustrate or impede effective political inclusion.      
 
Physical exclusion refers to all forms of interference or obstruction that deny individuals 
or groups physical access to facilities or areas otherwise open or available to the public. Forms of 
interference or obstruction may be, indeed, commonly are, indirect, such as stairs for a person in 
a wheelchair. There may be no intent to exclude persons who physically disabled or 
incapacitated in such cases, but the result is the same. Such persons are effectively excluded 
from fully participating as members of the broader community. They cannot experience the same 
sense of belonging that others experience. Even simple activities that fully-abled persons take for 
granted, such going to the movies, may be denied to someone lacks the capacity to walk or to 
climb stairs.  
 
As I discuss in Part V, the relationship between inclusiveness and property is complex. In 
practice, private ownership has been ambivalent between inclusion and exclusion, in the three 
senses in which I am using the term exclusion here. Historically, of course, and indeed, still 
today, the reality is that private ownership has been used as a keenly effective mechanism for 
exclusion, social, political, and physical. At the same time, however, property can be equally 
effective as a mechanism for inclusion, particularly social inclusion. As Eduardo Peñalver 
importantly observes, “private ownership can serve as a powerful vehicle for tying individuals 
more closely to their respective social groups.”63 In this respect the relationship between property 
and inclusiveness overlaps with the next public value that contributes to human flourishing ― 
community. 
 
C. Community 
 
Like inclusiveness, community as an aspect of human flourishing grows out of our 
inherent sociality. The understanding of the socially-rooted self means, among things, that “the 
identity of the autonomous, self-determining individual requires a social matrix . . . .”64 Humans 
are inevitably dependent upon social groups, some chosen, some not, not only for their health 
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and even survival but also their very status as free and rational agents.65 Communities are the 
mediating vehicles through which humans acquire the requisite capabilities to become free and 
rational agents. Moreover, as free and rational agents, humans never cease to operate within the 
matrices of multiple communities in which they find themselves throughout their lives.66  
Unlike the utilitarian conception of community, which regards community in strictly 
instrumental terms, i.e., as a means to satisfy individual preferences, the Aristotelian conception 
views community as constitutive of the self. Community is necessary for the well-lived life 
because the self’s very identity requires participation in social groups. Asked who we are, we 
invariably talk about the communities into which we were born and in which we were raised. We 
discuss our nation, our family, our friends, where we attended school, our religious community 
or similar groups, and social clubs. Indeed, individuals and their various and multiple 
communities interpenetrate each other to such an extent that they cannot be entirely separated 
from each other.67 
The connection between property and community is probably clearest in Hegel, in whose 
work property stands squarely at the intersection between the individual and the state.68 Hegel’s 
theory established a constitutive relationship among private property, personal identity, and 
community. Hegel’s greatest contribution to our understanding of property was to show not only 
how property anchors our free wills in the actual world of objects but, more fundamentally, to 
explain how property does the work of establishing social relationships. The whole point of his 
theory of personality and freedom was to show how a person develops into a member of an 
ethical community in the actual world. Hegel believed that the will that is free for itself was 
intelligible only in the context of concrete human existence. As James Penner states, “Freedom is 
situated in human society.”69 
The connection between property and community is hardly limited to Hegel. 
Utilitarianism, for example, recognizes the connection, albeit through a rather thin conception of 
community. According to utilitarianism’s strictly instrumentalist account, community is valuable 
just insofar as it contributes to maximizing aggregate utility. It is never an end or value itself.  
 Hanoch Dagan provides a much richer account of community as one of property’s 
important values. Dagan’s conception of community is at once constitutive and liberal.70 It is 
constitutive in the sense that “communities are important human goods exactly because they are 
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so significant to the identity of individual people.”71 It is liberal insofar as it retains the right of 
members to exit from their communities and so preserves individual autonomy.72  
 
 As Part V discusses, community is a problematic value for property because of 
community’s exclusionary character. Communities, by their very nature, exclude.73 This is the 
core dilemma that community poses for liberal property. Because of its inherently exclusionary 
character, community threatens to undermine other values that property serves, most 
conspicuously, inclusiveness. As I further discuss in Part V, human flourishing requires some 
means of mediating the tension between these values. 
 
D. Participation 
 
 The claim that participation is essential to the well-lived life is most commonly 
associated with Aristotle and with the republican tradition. 74 Within this theoretical tradition, 
participation means public participation ― the vita activa. Participation as a public value need 
not be so narrowly defined, however. We can understand participation more broadly as an aspect 
of inclusion. In this sense participation means belonging or membership, in a robust respect. 
Whether or not one actively participates in the formal affairs of the polity, one nevertheless 
participates in the life of the community if one experiences a sense of belonging as a member of 
that community.  
 
 Formal citizenship alone is insufficient to confer on a person a sense of belonging. 
Citizenship rings hollow when one can legally be excluded from places that are generally open to 
the public or when one has no meaningful opportunity to express one’s opinion about issues that 
affect one’s daily life practices or when one is legally disempowered from participating in all of 
the society’s legal and social institutions (e.g., marriage). It was precisely to cover such 
situations that the term “second-class citizenship” was coined.75 And it was precisely to eliminate 
such badges of second-class citizenship in the United States that statutes such as Title II of 1964 
Civil Rights Act,76 the main federal public accommodations statute, was enacted.  
 
 Arguably, citizenship not only is not a sufficient condition of belonging; it is not a 
necessary condition either. In some cases resident aliens, although legally barred from certain 
formal acts of participation, notably by voting, may experience a greater sense of belonging than 
do others who are citizens. Resident aliens who are members of groups that historically have not 
experienced domination or oppression may feel more welcome in places open to the public and 
may be more robustly enabled to participate in the community’s social practices. For example, in 
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many respects life in the United States has been and to a considerable extent remains far easier 
for a Green Card-holding white citizen of the U.K. than for an African American. Aside from 
formal methods of political participation, more forms of participation in the life of the 
community may be open to such resident aliens than to African American citizens, especially in 
certain parts of the U.S.  
 
E. Self-Constitution 
 
 By “self-constitution,” I mean the identity and sense of purpose that a person constructs 
for his life. Another term that might be used is “self-interpretation.” Self-constitution is closely 
related to the modern concept of personhood. It is not simply a psychological phenomenon but a 
moral value as well, for there are better and worse ways in which to develop and to interpret the 
self. This is why personhood is a moral concept, and in the same sense, so is self-constitution. 
 
 Self-constitution is not only a moral value but also a public value. This is so because, as 
Margaret Jane Radin observes, “self-constitution takes place in relation to an environment, both 
of things and of persons.”77 Radin continues, “This contextuality means that  . . . social contexts 
are integral to the construction of personhood.”78 Charles Taylor puts the point somewhat 
differently. He states: “[L]iving in society is a necessary condition of . . . becoming a moral 
agent in the full sense of the term, or of becoming a fully responsible, autonomous being.”79 
Self-constitution occurs in part through interactions with others; it is not solely an act of self-
will. More specifically, it occurs as a dialogic process between the self and society.  
 
 Taylor has offered a nuanced account of this dialogic process. He contends that self-
constitution is, in the first instance, a matter of self-interpretation, offering a conception of 
humans as “self-interpreting animals.”80 By that he means that the self is “a being who exists 
only in self-interpretation.”81 Individual selves, that is, are constituted, at least in part, by their 
own self-interpretations. Taylor adds, however, that these self-interpretations are not entirely a 
matter of our own doing. They are conducted in what Taylor calls “webs of locution.” He 
explains: “The community is also constitutive of the individual, in the sense that the self-
interpretations which define him are drawn from the interchange which the community carries 
on. A human being alone is an impossibility, not just de facto, but as it were de jure.”82  
 
 The dialogic character of self-constitution explains why it is a public, or social, value, as 
well as a private value. Indeed, self-constitution clarifies why a strong opposition between public 
and private is so misleading. The self is both constituting and constituted: Both the private and 
the public realms are necessary for the constitution of the self.  
 
 
IV. Why, Which, and When Public Values Are Among Property’s Ends  
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We live in multiple worlds. We inhabit worlds of the family, the home, the workplace, 
the market, the political arena, and other realms of human activity, and each of these realms may 
have multiple sub-realms. The world of politics, for example, for some people may include sub-
realms ranging from the blogosphere to the union hall to a neighborhood civic association. These 
multiple worlds are not always distinct from each other. Commonly, they overlap with other. The 
worlds of the home and politics, for example, may overlap with each other if, for example, a 
person lives in a condominium that is regulated by an owners association. The worlds of the 
family and the market sometimes overlap; think of family-owned businesses, for example. Our 
multiple worlds of activity commonly overlap with and blend into each other such that we cannot 
realistically isolate one from the other, each with its own discrete set of values.  
 
The overlapping and blending of our multiple worlds means that there is no separating, in 
any sort of categorical fashion, the public and private spheres, with their attending sets of values, 
from each other. When the different sets of values that attend different realms of human 
existence, public and private, encounter each other, conflicts between or among private and 
public values will sometimes occur. We cannot always avoid such conflicts between or among 
multiple relevant values by simply assigning values to separate “spheres of justice”83 or separate 
institutions.84 We do not live our lives so neatly compartmentalized as to permit that. 
 
Encounters between public and private values are not bound to produce conflicts, 
however. This is the point on which I wish to focus in this section: how human flourishing 
depends upon both public and private values. More specifically, the discussion in this section 
focuses on how the private values that are property’s ends require values that are usually 
regarded as public for their realization. Hence, encounters between private and public values, far 
from producing conflicts, involve mutually supportive engagements such that the relationships 
between private and public values are symbiotic.   
 
The upshot of this symbiotic relationship is that many nominally public values, including 
the values discussed in Part III, are internal to private law and are constitutive of its ends.85 
Because of our overlapping social spheres, which implicate both the public and private, values 
such as equality and community have a Janus-faced character. They operate in both realms, 
being neither exclusively public nor private. When they work in tandem with more strictly 
private values, such as personal autonomy, they properly belong among private law’s ends.    
When courts draw upon these values in adjudicating disputes between private parties, they draw 
upon private law’s internal resources rather than impose values that are exogenous to private 
law. 
 
At the same time, values that are usually considered to be public in character do not 
always function in this way. Values such as equality and community are internal to private law 
and are among property’s ends just insofar as they are necessary to enable other, conventional 
private law values to be realized. To the extent that conventional public values are not needed to 
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enable fulfillment of one or more traditional private law ends, then those values remain 
exogenous to private law.  
 
Just what does it mean to say that fulfillment of a traditional private law end requires one 
or more conventional public values? Consider first the private law value of individual autonomy. 
Every major liberal theory of property gives special place to autonomy as a justification for 
private property rights. Two theories ― Kantianism and libertarianism ― identify it as 
property’s foundational end. Even utilitarianism and its modern variant, welfarism, indirectly 
recognizes the special contribution of personal autonomy to overall social well-being, whether 
defined in terms of utility or wealth. No one would dispute that autonomy is at least a component 
of property’s ends.  
 
 But autonomy is not self-realizing. We are not born as autonomous agents. We depend 
upon others to help us develop those capabilities that enable us to function as independent 
practical reasoners. As Alastair MacIntyre states, “To become an effective independent practical 
reasoned is an achievement, but it is always one to which others have made essential 
contributions.”86 We enter the world utterly dependent on others for our physical survival, but 
our dependence on others doesn’t end with infancy or even with childhood. Even upon reaching 
adulthood, we continue to place at least partial physical dependence (and even emotional or 
psychological dependence) on others as we move through a dangerous world.  Often, little more 
than dumb luck separates the independent adult from the dependent one.  And, as we reach the 
final years of our lives, the possibility of physical dependence once again looms ever larger.  
 
 Our dependence on others to develop autonomy goes beyond sheer physical dependence. 
MacIntyre observes, “What we need from others, if we are . . . to develop the capacities of 
independent practical reasoners, are those relationships necessary for fostering the ability to 
evaluate, modify, or reject our own practical judgments, to ask, that is, whether what we take to 
be good reasons for action really are sufficiently good reasons, and the ability to imagine 
realistically alternative possible futures, so as to be able to make rational choices between them, 
and the ability to stand back from our desires, so as to be able to enquire rationally what the 
pursuit of our good here and now requires and how our desire must be directed and, if necessary, 
reeducated, if we are to attain it.”87  
 
 This kind of nurturing and this sort of capability-development is carried out through 
communities, through networks of family members, friends, teachers, and others who constitute 
the multiple social spheres of our lives. Individual autonomy can be acquired only within a vital 
matrix of social structures and practices. Its continued existence and exercise depends upon a 
richly social, cultural, and institutional context, and the free and autonomous individual must rely 
upon others to provide this context.  
 
 Communities are the mediating vehicles through which we come to acquire the 
capabilities we need to flourish and to become fully socialized into the exercise of those 
capabilities. As free, rational persons, we never cease to operate within and depend upon the 
matrices of the many communities in which we find ourselves in association. Each of our identities 
is inextricably connected in some sense to others with whom we are connected as members of one or 
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typically more communities.  Our identities are literally constituted by the communities of which 
we are members. Asked who we are, we inevitably talk about the communities where we were 
born and raised, our nation, our family, where we attended school, our friends, our religious 
communities and clubs. Indeed, individuals and communities interpenetrate one another so 
completely that they can never be fully separated.  
 
 If autonomy depends upon community for its realization, the opposite is true as well. That 
is, community requires personal autonomy as well. Hanoch Dagan has written persuasively about 
the important role that individual autonomy plays in realizing a conception of community that 
avoids oppression. “This conception [of community],” Dagan writes, “is premised on the insight 
that communities are important human goods exactly because they are so significant to the 
identity of individual people.”88 Dagan points out that for community and autonomy to work 
together in this mutually supportive fashion, “members’ identification with [their] communit[ies] 
and their commitment [the communities’] goals should never erase their individual identity.”89 
When community does erase individual identity, denying personal autonomy, it inhibits rather 
than promote human flourishing. A person whose community denies her personal autonomy 
cannot develop the capability for independent practical reasoning, which is essential to a well-
lived life. 
 
 Consider another private value commonly given prominent place in property theory ― 
personal security. One reason why the right to exclude looms so large in discussions of what 
private ownership involves is the intuition that private ownership of property protects people 
insofar as they have the right to exclude others out from their personal dwelling. “A man’s [sic] 
home is his castle” expresses an aspiration of security, among other values. The connection 
between property and personal security applies not only to land, but to money and intangible 
forms of property as well. For personal security includes financial security as well as physical 
security. 
 
 Like autonomy, personal security cannot be fully realized in isolation from other values, 
including public values. Consider the relationship between personal security and equality. 
Though hardly apparent at first glance, the relationship between the two values is in fact 
mutually dependent, as the relationship between autonomy and community is. If we understand 
equality in terms of non-domination or non-subordination, then the relationship between personal 
security and equality is perhaps more readily perceived.  
 
 To illustrate the relationship, imagine a married woman whose husband routinely beats her 
after returning home from a night of drinking. This is, unfortunately, not just a story but the all-
too-real existence of hundreds, perhaps thousands of women around the world. Why do they not 
leave their husbands, people often ask. Especially with respect to women in the advanced 
countries of the West, where married women are ostensibly less encumbered by cultural taboos 
and other restrictions, people often find it difficult to understand why married women in such 
circumstances remain with abusive men. The answer, or at least part of the answer, I think, lies 
in the link between personal security and equality, or in this context, between personal insecurity 
and inequality. Women in abusive marriages often do not leave their husbands because they feel 
unable to do so; they feel trapped and tied to their abusers, unable to free themselves.90  
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Such women are paradigmatic examples of what I mean by having unequal status, or living 
unequally. Their marriages are characterized by domination.91 Their husbands have effectively 
subordinated them in a deep and profound sense that bears some resemblance to a master-slave 
relationship. In such a relationship, woman can hardly feel physically secure. Part of what 
personal security means in a relationship is the knowledge that one’s partner will treat one with 
respect in a physical sense. Personal security is meaningless within a relationship in which one is 
dominated in multiple respects, including physically, by the other.  
 
Relationally, security requires equality among the parties to the relationship. It may also 
require equality in a financial sense as well, depending upon the relationship. Consider marriage 
again. Hanoch Dagan insightfully analyzes marriage as an “egalitarian liberal community” that 
brings together three values ― community, autonomy, and equality.92 Dagan’s conception of 
equality reflects the same notion of non-subordination that I have used here,93 but he also uses an 
equality-of-goods conception when he analyzes marital property law. Regarding that law, he 
argues, “[t]he core of the[] background rules [should be] the rule of equal sharing of the marital 
estate broadly defined.”94 The reason he gives for this core rule reveals the connection between 
equality-of-resources and security. Dagan states, “This rule aims to ameliorate the inevitable 
vulnerability that is an inextricable part of long-term relationships of trust and cooperation.”95 
What Dagan refers to as “the inevitable vulnerability” is what I have been discussing in terms of 
personal insecurity. Dagan seems correct in arguing that vulnerability goes with the territory in 
any relationship of trust and cooperation. But vulnerability ― personal insecurity ― is a matter 
of degree, and in relationships of inequality, in the sense of power subordination or resource 
imbalance (or both), there is a good deal more vulnerability than where the parties deal with each 
other as equals operating at arms-length from each other, as in a long-term contract between two 
merchants. Vulnerability and inequality go together, hand-in-glove. This is why equality, a 
public value, is necessary for the realization of personal security, one of property’s important 
private ends.  
 
 The dependency of security on equality is empirical, not conceptual. It is conceivable that 
there are or have been unequal relationships in which the subordinated party enjoys personal 
security. Hierarchical social relationships do inherently create vulnerability, but the dominant 
party may not exploit that vulnerability. If it is not, personal security is possible. To be sure, this 
is a somewhat tenuous form of personal security insofar as there remains a risk that the dominant 
party will take advantage of the opportunity to exploit. But some degree of vulnerability is 
always uneliminable, even under conditions of equality. I may become the victim of a bad person 
or a tragic accident. A standard of no vulnerability for personal security is too demanding to be 
realistic or workable. As an empirical matter, however, it seems plausible to suppose that the 
degree of vulnerability increases substantially for subordinated or dominated persons. 
 
 Facilitation between security and equality works the other way around as well. That is, 
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personal security promotes equality (again, as non-domination). Equality between persons in 
which one party is subject to ongoing harm or degradation of some sort (or the threat thereof), 
such as through physical or emotional abuse or massive financial loss, seems false. A 
relationship between two equals is one that is between two individuals each of whom can, 
speaking metaphorically, stand on her own two feet.96 
 
 In general terms, the public values contribute to, indeed are part of, property’s ends 
because of the kind of beings we are. If we understand, as Aristotle does, our character as social 
animals, then any conception of human flourishing that draws upon an interpretation of human 
character, as mine does, must likewise emphasize the social dimension of human flourishing. 
This means that human flourishing cannot be strictly a private matter, a matter of becoming an 
autonomous agent who enjoys personal security and is self-determining in isolation from 
particular communities and from society more broadly. From the neo- (or quasi-) Aristotelian 
perspective, human flourishing,  affected as it is by the social character of human beings, must 
itself be a social as well as an individual matter. Moreover, human flourishing is not a matter of 
simply the two dimensions ― the social and the individual ― together; rather, it is a matter of 
those two dimensions inevitably working together in mutually supportive ways. This is why the 
public values, which are the value that attend the social dimension, must be part of property’s 
ends along with the private values. Let me unpack this theory a bit with some preliminary 
observations and assumptions that I need to acknowledge but cannot defend here. 
 
  First, in arguing that what human flourishing involves is affected by human character, the 
neo-Aristotelian approach taken here should not be understood as reductive or essentialist. It is 
important to emphasize that the approach does not adopt an essentialist theory of human nature. 
It does not assume that there is some inner “me” that is waiting to be “discovered.” Nor is it 
premised on a physicalist version of natural law. Rather, it is premised on an interpretive 
rendering of the human condition, a hermeneutic approach to understanding what makes us 
human. This account at once emphasizes our individuality and our situatedness within a society.  
These two characteristics of the human condition ― autonomy and membership ― are not 
opposed to each other but mutually constitutive. They are so through a process that is best 
termed “dialogic.” We need dialogue and interaction with others in order to constitute and to 
understand ourselves. There is no end to this dialogue, no final self that, once constituted or 
discovered, remains unchanged. 
 
  Although what human flourishing involves is based on an understanding of the human 
condition, that understanding does not dictate the terms of human flourishing. That is, it does not 
specify what values must be included on any list of human flourishing. Still, although an 
interpretation of the human condition does not dictate the specific content of human flourishing, 
it does set the boundaries of the contents and limits of human flourishing.97  
 
  The neo-Aristotelian understanding of the human condition adopted in this Article 
emphasizes the social character of human beings. This view contrasts sharply with the 
conception of the human condition that lies at the heart of the classical social contract tradition. 
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The basic premise of social contractarianism is the idea that, at least in theory, there exists a pre-
social rational human agent who is capable of entering into a contract.98 When Aristotle said, 
“The man who is isolated ─ who is unable to share in the benefits of political association, or has 
no need to share because he is already self-sufficient ─ is no part of the polis, and must therefore 
be either a beast or a god,”99 he was expressing the fundamentally opposed view that we are 
always already socially situated.100  
 
 Our lived experience and our own observations give us good reasons to think that Aristotle 
was right and to reject the social contractarian view of the human condition. As I have already 
indicated, autonomy is not self-realizing. In our own lives, we do not possess from infancy the 
capabilities that are part of what it means to be an autonomous agent. We learn those abilities 
from others, not only in the home, but in school, at play, and, as we grow older, in continually 
widening social circles.  
 
  In all of these experiences, it is not only private values that are at work. Because we are 
socially situated, human flourishing must include values which themselves are social or public in 
character. The measure of a well-lived life cannot be taken in terms of the individual in isolation 
from others. The values of the private sphere are not sufficient to provide a complete account of 
what exactly it means and what exactly is required for each member of this most social of 
species to flourish in its characteristic way. A full such account requires inclusion of the public 
sphere as well. Indeed, as I have already suggested, the two, being mutually supportive, can 
hardly be separated when discussing human flourishing. 
 
V. Public and Private Together: Two Examples 
 
  To illustrate the ways in which public and private values that constitute human flourishing 
― property’s ends ― are symbiotic, this Part discusses two topics that have prompted 
considerable controversy in property legal literature within the past several years, the right of 
owners to exclude others and the enforceability of homeowner association rules. 
 
A. The Right to Exclude ─ Autonomy and Self-Constitution 
 
 One of the more vibrant debates among property legal theorists in recent years has been the 
role and scope of the right to exclude.101 Some scholars have argued that the right to exclude is 
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essential to the concept of ownership.102 Some have even contended that it is the sine qua non of 
ownership.103 Other scholars have argued that although the right to exclude is important, it is 
only part of the complex core of ownership.104  
 
 Regardless of the centrality of the right to exclude to ownership, the right to exclude 
illustrates how property law’s private ends require public values to be realized. Virtually all 
property theorists agree that chief among the private values that support the right to exclude is 
individual autonomy, specifically personal autonomy.105 As Joseph Raz puts it, “The ruling idea 
behind the idea of personal autonomy is that people should be able to make up their own 
lives.”106 The autonomous person is the creator, at least partly, of the course of her own life, 
controlling it by making a series of decisions about how her life should go. On this view, these 
decisions need all cohere with a comprehensive life plan. People change their minds, develop 
different tastes, and even entertain conflicting preferences. The point of personal autonomy is all 
of these ideas, tastes, and preferences are the creations of the person who holds them.  
 
 The close relationship between private ownership and the right to exclude more specifically 
is easy to see.107 As James Penner puts it, “[T]he freedom to determine to use of things is an 
interest of ours in part because of the freedom it provides to shape our lives.”108 Penner provides 
one way of linking the right to exclude with personal autonomy.109 In Penner’s analysis, the link 
between freedom to use and freedom to shape our lives further establishes the link between the 
right to exclude and autonomy, or individual freedom. The right to use and right to exclude are, 
in his terms, two sides of the same coin. As Penner explains, “[T]he natural link of the right to 
exclude with use is simply that rightful exclusion of someone from a thing will always be 
purposeful, i.e., having some purpose in respect of the use to which the thing will be put.”110 At a 
minimum, it seems safe to say that if we are able to use things exclusively, those things can be 
valuable tools with which we can shape our lives, which is the very meaning of personal 
autonomy. To the extent, then, that a “simple robust morality supporting exclusion rights”111 
exists, personal autonomy is surely part of that morality. 
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 The familiar Tragedy of the Commons scenario112 illustrates the connection between 
personal autonomy and the right to exclude. Here is the scenario: 
 
 Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many 
 cattle as possible on the commons . . . . As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to 
 maximize his gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more of less consciously, he asks, “What is the 
 utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?” This utility has one negative and one 
 positive component. 
1. The positive component is a function of the increment of one animal. Since the 
herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, the positive 
utility is nearly +1. 
2. The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created by one 
more animal. Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all the 
herdsmen, the negative utility for any particular decision-making herdsman is only a 
fraction of -1. 
   Adding together the component utilities, the rational herdsman concludes that the only 
 sensible course for him to pursue is to add is to add another animal to his herd. An another. . 
 . . But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a 
 commons. Therein is the tragedy.113 
 
 Hardin depicts the tragedy is utilitarian terms, but it is also a tragedy in terms of personal 
autonomy, as he implicitly acknowledges. For not only does aggregate society lose, but each 
individual herdsman suffers a loss of personal autonomy with respect to the use of his cattle. 
True, in a superficial sense he is free to choose whether to add another animal to the common for 
grazing or desist from doing so in order to avoid overgrazing. But in a deeper sense he does not 
have robust autonomy over this choice because the inexorable logic of rational self-interest 
compels him to add another animal. The right to exclude would free each herdsman from that 
logic and provide him with robust autonomy. For then each herdsman would be free to decide 
what use of every animal he owns and what use of his portion of the pasture best fulfill the goals 
he has set for himself, without any interference from others.114  
 
 This scenario of complete personal autonomy secured solely through the right to exclude is 
radically incomplete, however. The right to exclude alone does not enable individuals to realize 
their own autonomy. What connects the right to exclude with personal autonomy are certain 
social arrangements, arrangements over which the individual does not have sole control. For 
example, as other property theorists have pointed out,115 neither Hardin nor any of the other early 
theorists of the Tragedy of the Commons explained how a group would change its ownership 
from a commons to individual ownership with a right to exclude. Such a shift is a social 
endeavor, requiring the consent of all members of the group. To be fully realized, autonomy 
requires cooperation, a social, or public value. The shift from the commons to exclusive 
individual ownership cannot get off the ground without social cooperation.  
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 The same holds true of enforcement of the right to exclude. Suppose that herdsman A owns, 
and owns exclusively, a parcel of grazing land. He also owns, exclusively, a herd of cattle. What 
prevents other herdsmen from grazing their cattle on A’s land or stealing his cattle? How can A 
enforce his right to exclude them from his land? A might use self-help measures, of course, but 
self-help can be costly. Not only must A erect fencing completely around his land to keep his 
cattle in and others out, but he must police that fencing periodically. It would be far cheaper for 
A if he could rely on a collective system of enforceable rules, either as a supplement to self-help 
or as a replacement for it, perhaps where the risk of a breach of the peace is substantial. Such an 
enforcement system, like the creation of exclusion rules, requires cooperation, a social value. 
 
 We can broaden this point about the right to exclude: The right to exclude is meaningless, 
that is, it is conceptually incoherently in social isolation. It acquires meaning only in the context 
of social relationships.116 The right to exclude is the hole in the doughnut. It exists only when 
placed in the context of a society whose members are potential users of scarce resources that 
others wish not to share for various reasons.117 Remove those members and the need for the right 
to exclude, indeed, the very intelligibility of such a right, disappears. In this sense, the right to 
exclude conceptually depends upon society.  
 
 The point can be pushed more deeply. For the private law value that is commonly thought to 
support the right to exclude ─ personal autonomy ─ itself depends upon social and public values 
for conceptual coherence. Specifically, personal autonomy, if we understand it as the capacity to 
shape our own lives, requires and rests upon self-constitution as a public value. The remainder of 
this section explains and defends this claim. 
 
 Recall the personal autonomy means that a person is able to shape his own goals and to 
make his own decisions about which available options will make his life go best for him. No one 
makes such choices in complete isolation from others from birth through death. Everyone to 
varying degrees depends on others for help in shaping those goals and making those choices. The 
forms that such help take and the people from whom it comes vary widely from person to person. 
Moreover, for each person, such the forms and sources of such help also vary over the course of 
our lives. We are not always aware of this help, so it sometimes comes not only unrequested but 
so subtly that we scarcely, if at all, notice. The sorts of help that I have in mind range from 
obvious examples such as sustenance, care, training, companionship, and other from parents, 
teachers, friends, and neighbors to educational and career advice that parents and mentors give us 
to less conspicuous examples such as political leaders who have supported legislation that have 
enabled us to receive education or job training and others who have made decisions that have 
presented us with options that would not otherwise have been available to us, whether we took 
advantage of those options or not. It is hard to imagine any single choice or decision made during 
our lives that has not been influenced, if not directly aided, by someone. Autonomous choices are 
always nested in webs of social relationships. Truly individual choices do not exist. 
 
 Autonomy depends upon a richly social, cultural, and institutional context for the 
presence of which the autonomous individual must rely on others. From this perspective, another 
public value that both complements and supports personal autonomy is membership. Individuals 
                                                          
116
 Cf. Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, supra note 114, at 347 (“In the world of Robinson Crusoe, 
property rights play no role.”). 
117
 Cf. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW, supra note 102, at 70: “The right to use something so long as no 
one else was using it or wanted to use it is equivalent to having no right to exclusion whatsoever.” 
26 
 
become autonomous agents through membership in various social groups throughout the course 
of their lives. The identity of the groups to which individuals belong changes over time, but at no 
point in a person’s life is he not a member of some group, usually many groups. Individuals are 
inevitably dependent upon membership in groups, both chosen and not chosen, to develop as free 
and rational agents. Personal autonomy is not inherited; it is learned. We are not born as 
autonomous agents; rather, we develop as autonomous beings through help from fellow group 
members. 
 
 At this point we can how autonomy, a private value, draws support from self-constitution, 
a public, or social, value. Earlier I defined self-constitution as the identity and sense of purpose 
that a person constructs for his life.118 Self-constitution is the process of interpreting oneself 
within a social context. Because self-constitution always occurs within a social context it is 
dialogic in character.119 This is why autonomy cannot be adequately understood apart from self-
constitution. For autonomy expresses the self that is constituting, but that same self is 
simultaneously constituted, which self-constitution expresses.  
 
 So, how does this conception of personal autonomy as acquired through dialogic self-
constitution rather than inherited in isolation of others relate to the right to exclude? There is 
always a tension in the process of developing as an autonomous person: On the one hand, 
autonomy depends upon being nested within various social groups; on the other hand, the very 
fact of being so situated, i.e., within groups of other individuals, itself creates a risk that our 
choices, or at least some of them, will be coerced, negating autonomy.120 The right to exclude 
mitigates this risk. As James Penner has explained,121 the right to exclude is best understood in 
negative terms, i.e., in terms of the in rem duties of others not to interfere with one’s property. 
This way of thinking about the exclusion right has the salutary effect of forcing attention on 
others rather than viewing the right to exclude in social isolation. The right to exclude places 
duties on our fellow members of the various groups to which we belong, however loosely, not to 
interfere with the choices we make about the use of our property. It reflects a conception of self-
constitution that assures that the dialogic process of self-constitution supports rather than 
undermines personal autonomy. It does so by defining limits, vis-à-vis our property, on our 
fellow members’ interactions with us to assure that those interactions only contribute to or enable 
the development of our autonomy, or at least that their interactions with us to not undermine our 
autonomous development. When asking, then, whether another person who has had some 
interaction with an owner in the use of her property, the relevant question to ask is always, does 
that person’s interaction promote the owner’s autonomous development or does it undermine it 
(or at least pose a significant risk of doing so)?  
 
 To see the effect of asking that question in different contexts, consider first a simple 
hypothetical based on ordinary trespass law. Suppose that you walk to work every day. The 
quickest and easiest route is to walk across a back section of the lot on which my house, which is 
my only residence, is located. There is another route you could take, one that involves no 
trespassing, but it adds 10 minutes to your walk. Besides, you think, the section of my lot that 
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you cross is apparently unused, and your walk would be, as far as you can tell, unobtrusive. 
Should I, as the owner, nevertheless, be able to exclude you from walking across my property? 
The law of trespass says yes, and this is plainly the correct answer. Your use of my land, 
however seemingly minimal, poses a non-trivial risk of undermining my development as a 
person who is able to make and carry out his own options. Even putting aside the risk that your 
continued use of my land as a right-of-way might ripen into an easement of way, your use 
removes certain options that would otherwise be open to me. If I cannot exclude you, I no longer 
have the freedom, as the owner, to use that portion of my land as a garden or other development 
purposes. Your use has reduced my personal autonomy.  
 
 The right to exclude operates as a means of establishing a limit on the social dimension of 
self-constitution such that self-constitution promotes rather than impedes personal autonomy. It 
is particularly strong in circumstances like my example where the property upon which the 
trespass has occurred is the owner’s home. This situation involves another private value, closely 
related to personal autonomy ─ personal security ─ and the need to assure that self-constitution 
promotes rather than impedes personal security is especially strong.  
 
 The same concern explains the result in the well-known right-to-exclude case, Jacques v. 
Steenburg Homes, Inc.122 In that case, home owners, Lois and Harvey Jacque, sued Steenberg 
Homes for damages for intentional trespass to the Jacques’ land. Steenberg delivered a mobile 
home by plowing a path across the Jacques’ snow-covered field despite strenuous protests from 
the Jacques. Although other means of accessing the delivery location were available, Steenberg 
used the path across the Jacques’ land because that was the easiest route for him. The jury 
awarded the Jacques $1 in nominal damages and $100,000 in punitive damages. On appeal, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that if a jury awards nominal damages for intentional trespass, 
the jury may also award punitive damages. The Jacques had good autonomy-based reasons for 
excluding Steenberg Homes. If home-dwellers are to feel secure in their own homes and to be 
uncoerced in making decisions regarding what uses of their land will make their lives go best for 
them, they must be free of intentional trespass. There are exceptional situations, of course, such 
as the need for police or fire-fighters to access a person’s home in case of emergency, but the 
owner is not likely to object to entrance upon her property under such circumstances.  
 
 Contrast Jacques with the famous Civil Rights Era “Lunch Counter” cases.123 In those 
cases, young African-Americans were arrested for and convicted of criminal trespass when they 
refused to leave restaurants after being requested to do so solely because of their race. The 
alleged trespassers, who were protesting “whites-only” practices at lunch counters in Southern 
retail stores, had asked to being served lunch but were refused and asked to leave. The 
defendants appealed their convictions arguing that the convictions violated their rights under the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The cases raised the question whether 
state action was involved or whether the discrimination was strictly private. In each case the 
Court found state action.124 
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 Would such cases be decided differently under the common law? Would they be viewed 
the same as Jacques, with the restaurant owner having the right to exclude anyone for whatever 
reason? Although there certainly are older decisions that indicate otherwise,125 I suggest that it 
would be possible for a court to hold that a restaurant owner does not have the right to exclude 
for racially discriminatory reasons (or other reasons based on grounds of invidious 
discrimination) under the private law of property. The public values that nurture property’s 
private values push against the freedom of owners of restaurants that are otherwise open to the 
public to exclude members of the owners’ communities because of their race. Because the 
owners have otherwise opened their restaurants to the general public, the owner’s personal 
security is not at stake in this situation. Admitting African-American patrons in no way adds to 
the risk of the owners’ security beyond the level of risk that the owners have already voluntarily 
accepted.   
 
 More fundamentally, the public value of self-constitution, which is necessary for personal 
autonomy, resists recognition of the owners’ right to exclude under these circumstances. I said 
earlier that self-constitution ─ the process of interpreting oneself within a social context ─ is 
always dialogic in character. I also said that self-constitution’s social dimension poses a risk of 
undermining rather than promoting personal autonomy and that the purpose of the right to 
exclude is to mitigate that risk. Where the interaction between the owner and others is already in 
a social and public setting, one that the owner has created, the owner has already assumed that 
risk by creating the setting. In that situation the risk to exclude cannot perform its risk-mitigation 
function. Requiring that the owner admit to his restaurant patrons who he would otherwise admit 
but for their race does not undermine his personal autonomy in any meaningful sense, for he has 
already made choices about his goals with respect to the use of his property, choices that are 
immediately relevant to his right to exclude in this circumstance. Hence, it is quite arguable that 
the public accommodation cases such as these could have been decided the same way as they 
were on private law grounds with relying on constitutional or statutory provisions.126   
 
B. The Enforceability of Homeowner Association Rules 
 
 Let us return to the case with which we began ─ Donald Lamp and his American flag. What 
private and public values are at stake in this dispute? Mr. Lamp expressed contracted not to 
display any flags outside his apartment. He freely accepted a restriction on his freedom as a 
homeowner that imposed on him certain obligations to members of his residential community. 
Such a contractual obligation implicates a private value that is central to property, namely, 
personal responsibility. This value subsumes the legal principles surrounding freedom of contract 
and contractual obligations, for, as the earlier discussion of this value indicated,127 personal 
responsibility includes specific obligations that individuals owe to others. Personal 
responsibility, then, obviously plays a prominent role in disputes of this kind.  
 
 At one level disputes such as Donald Lamp’s seem easily resolved by looking at the matter 
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through the lens of personal responsibility with its concomitant legal principle of contractual 
obligation. Lamp signed an agreement expressly restricting his freedom to display flags publicly, 
and he is responsible for that contractual commitment. Yet if we examine the matter a bit more 
deeply it becomes apparent that personal responsibility does not exhaust the list of private law 
values that are at stake in Lamp’s dispute. For personal autonomy seems just as obviously 
involved in the controversy. As we have already discussed, personal autonomy means being the 
creator of one’s own ideas and preferences. To be sure, it does not mean being immune from all 
involvement by others in one’s affairs; that is an impossible state of affairs. But it does mean that 
one’s plans, ideas, beliefs, and so on, are one’s own, uncoerced by others.  
 
 One can certainly point out that by signing the deed which included the restrictive covenant 
Mr. Lamp freely chose to restrict his own autonomy with respect to displaying flags outside his 
apartment. From that perspective, personal responsibility trumps any view of personal autonomy 
that suggests tension between the two values in this case. Yet closely related to personal 
autonomy in this situation is yet another value ─ self-expression. Sometimes it is not enough 
simply to hold views that are the creations of one’s own making; one feels compelled to express 
those views. On these occasions self-expression supports and even extends personal autonomy. 
Lamp held deeply personal beliefs and chose to use his position as homeowner to express those 
beliefs publicly. The American flag symbolized beliefs that Lamp considered expressive of his 
identity, and he wished to communicate those beliefs with his neighbors in a particularly 
prominent and effective way. Self-expression is an important value that does not merely augment 
autonomy but also enables the exercise of autonomy. From that perspective autonomy alone 
cannot justify Lamp’s waiver of self-expression.  
 
 One possible basis for justifying waiver is freedom of association. Homeowner associations, 
like other voluntary associations, rely on freedom of association for their integrity and, 
ultimately, their existence. Lacking the freedom not only to choose the persons with whom we 
associate but also ground rules by which our association provides, we cannot truly realize our 
social character. 
 
 The connection between freedom of association and human sociability suggests that 
freedom of association implicates a deeper value ─ community. Conceptually, community is 
relevant here as a value, a regulative ideal, and as a sociological phenomenon.128As a regulative 
ideal, community operates as a norm by which relationships may be regulated and something 
that we experience in our actual lives. Community is also a sociological concept. In this sense it 
describes a group mode of living and social interaction with others with whom we share 
particular interests and values. Homeowner associations are frequently identified as communities 
in this latter, sociological sense. Common interest developments often stress the club-like quality 
of their living experience, explicitly emphasizing their group-like character.129  
 
 As a value, community is essential to human flourishing, intimately connected with our 
inherent sociality. As I indicated earlier,130 community is constitutive of the self. It is necessary 
for the well-lived life because the self’s very identity requires participation in social groups. In 
its relationship to freedom of association, community seemingly serves a private function, but 
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community has two dimension, public as well as private. Community expresses relationships 
among humans that are at once individual and social, individual because one does not sacrifice 
personal autonomy or self-identity by entering into them, social because self-identity requires 
participation in social groups. Such relationships are relationships that are voluntarily created by 
free and equal moral agents who wish to enter into sharing experiences with others to enable 
their own lives to go well, i.e., to flourish.      
 
 At the same time, community, both as a value and as a social institution, has a second 
dimension, one that is public in nature. As a social institution, communities are nested, one 
within the other, including the state. Recognition that the state is a community illuminates the 
fact that, in its role as a social institution, community is both public and private. The same holds 
true for community as a value. In this respect community, as a value, is like self-constitution, 
which, as we saw earlier,131 also has both an individual and a social dimension. Community’s 
public side regulates the external relations of communities as institutions, that is, their relations 
with each other, especially the larger communities of which it is a part. The most important of 
these larger communities is the state, for the state facilitates these smaller communities through 
its rules of private ordering and fundamental norms respecting rights of association, assembly 
and the like. 
 
 The general point is that the categories of public and private are unhelpful with respect to 
community. The line between them is as porous as it is with respect to all of the values 
underlying property. Both institutionally and normatively, community operates in a Janus-faced 
fashion, always looking inward to itself and yet outward to the increasingly larger spheres of 
social life with which it is inextricably enmeshed.  
 
 This double life of community is essential to a proper understanding of community’s role as 
a value, or end, of property. It means that community’s normative valence is not always clear. 
When other substantive values of small institutional communities conflict with those of one or 
more of the larger institutional communities within which the smaller communities are nested, 
the normative implication of community does not unambiguously favor one substantive value or 
the other. There is no trumping effect of community as a value. What matters in these situations 
of nested communities with conflicting substantive values is the nature of the relationship 
between the institutional communities. What precisely does it mean to say, that is, that the 
communities are nested, other than the facts that one is larger than the other and that the smaller 
community is located in some relevant sense within the larger one?  
 
 The previous discussion of self-constitution noted that self-constitution’s social dimension 
poses a risk of undermining rather than promoting personal autonomy.132 In the case of 
community, it is its private side that poses this risk. The core of community’s private side is 
autonomy, the value that supports the power of communities, as institutions, to exclude those 
who do not share the constituent values and interests of particular communities. That value ─ 
autonomy ─ confers upon communities power to set the terms and conditions of membership in 
voluntary communities, requiring members to subordinate their own personal autonomy for the 
good of the larger institution’s values.  
 
 The public side of community, as a private law value, places a limit on this subordination of 
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personal autonomy and supports autonomy as one of property’s ends by striking a balance 
between personal and institutional autonomy. The basis for this limit is the fact that the state, as 
the community that enables the creation of voluntary communities through its private legal rules 
of contract and constitutional rights of assembly and free association, and facilitates the 
operation of those communities through its legal system, is literally is constitutive of them. As 
the foundational community that makes the existence of smaller, nested communities possible, 
the state sets the basic parameters for their membership within the foundational, constitutive 
community. Those parameters are set by the state’s own foundational values, the values of which 
it is normatively constituted. Among these foundational values is personal autonomy, augmented 
by its ancillary value of self-expression. These values are constitutive of the state as a political 
community. Self-expression, which is manifested, among other ways, in the right of freedom of 
speech, is essential to the existence of a particular kind of political community, and for that 
reason the state treats it as fundamental. Because self-expression is so existential, it cannot be 
subordinated to conflicting values of smaller voluntary communities. This is not a matter of state 
action or public law. The priority of the state’s fundamental values, values such as personal 
autonomy and self-expression, over the values of nested voluntary communities, is established 
by private law, through its values.  
 
 In cases such as Mr. Lamp’s, the public side of community as a private law value resists 
recognition of the right of voluntary groups, including those created by private agreement, to 
subordinate values that are existential to the particular kind of political community that the state 
represents to the group’s own conflicting values. Hence, the question whether Lamp waived his 
right to display the American flag in front of his condominium unit is moot because, properly 
understood, the private law of property makes the value of self-expression non-waivable as 
applied to such forms of self-expression as political speech.133  
 
 Of course, there are limits to this principle of subordination. It applies only to those values 
that are truly existential to the particular kind of political community that the state represents. 
Hence, in the case of homeowner associations, not all instances of self-expression or other acts 
of personal autonomy are or should be beyond the group’s power to regulate. So, for example, a 
homeowner association covenant prohibiting outdoor displays of plastic pink flamingoes is 
valid.134 Such an aesthetic regulation, although restricting self-expression, in no way implicates 
values that are existential to the substantive character of the larger political community. The 
same will be true of the vast majority of homeowner association rules. Group autonomy, which 
promotes the integrally related values of free association and sociability, should normally prevail 
because it is supported by community’s private aspect and does not interfere with its public 
dimension. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
  Property’s ultimate end is human flourishing. Because human flourishing is itself comprised 
of multiple ends, property’s ends are multiple and varied. These ends, values of private law, have 
both private and public dimensions, and private law itself negotiates the relationship between 
these two aspects of its values. The relationship between the public and private often turns out to 
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be supportive rather than conflict. The values that are part of property’s public dimension in 
many instances are necessary to support, facilitate, and enable property’s private ends. Hence, 
any account of public and private values that depicts them as categorically separate is grossly 
misleading. One important consequence of this insight is that many legal disputes that appear to 
pose a conflict between the private and public spheres or that seemingly require the involvement 
of public law can and should, in fact, be resolved on the basis of private law ─ the law of 
property ─ alone. Private law turns out to be much richer than conventional wisdom recognizes. 
      
 
  
  
 
    
 
 
  
